"A Price for Peace: Troop Contributing Countries' Responses to Peacekeeper Fatalities" 2021, International Interactions
Abstract: How do states respond to fatalities of their troops in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs)? Recent research highlights that participation in peacekeeping is costly for most states. Personnel fatalities should create further costs for contributors and often result in a reduction of their commitments. Studies that evaluate this expectation yield mixed findings. One finds little evidence that OECD countries provide fewer personnel to UN PKOs following fatalities. In contrast, another finds that fatalities generally correspond with reductions in states’ personnel commitments to UN operations in Africa but also reveals that wealthier contributors tend to withdraw at larger magnitudes than their poorer counterparts. This study builds on this work by further hypothesizing that the incentives that motivate states to participate in PKOs condition their willingness to maintain their contributions after experiencing fatalities. An analysis of states’ troop fatalities and commitments to 41 UN operations from 1990 to 2015 supports this expectation. States that are contiguous to an operation, which face greater concerns about the externalities of nearby conflicts, and states that receive side payments for their troop commitments, via foreign aid, are more willing to maintain their commitments in response to fatalities of their troops than other contributors. Additional findings suggest that non-contiguous contributors that do not receive side payments are also inclined to withdraw troops in response to upticks in organized violence surrounding a mission as well as fatalities of other contributors' troops. These results illustrate that the motives that states face to participate in PKOs also affect their willingness to maintain their troop commitments as their costs for participation increase.
"Does Counterterrorism Militarize Foreign Aid? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa" 2017 (co-authored with Tobias Heinrich and Carla Martinez Machain), Journal of Peace Research
Abstract: This article studies whether the pursuit of counterterrorism militarizes foreign aid flows. It focuses on the case of US foreign aid to sub-Saharan African states, which recently have experienced an increase in the presence of al-Qaeda or its affiliate terrorist organizations. This article argues that as terrorist groups carry out attacks inside a state’s territory, aid towards that state will serve such counterterrorism goals. For one, the state’s executive branch will receive increased military aid to immediately fight al-Qaeda or affiliates. For the other, the United States also steps up aid for civil society and development, which could over time undermine al-Qaeda’s mobilization and recruitment efforts. In an empirical analysis that covers 46 African states from 1996 to 2011, our results largely corroborate the hypothesized patterns for attacks that occur on a country territory and in the neighborhood. We note, though, that the overall composition of aid shifts relative to the military when there are direct attacks, something that does not occur when attacks happen in the neighborhood only. Our article concludes that concerns about militarization of aid are warranted, but that actual manifestations are nuanced.
"Great Power and Foreign Policy," 2017 (co-authored with Carla Martinez Machain and Rebecca Kaye), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.
"The Limit of American Public Support for Military Intervention" (co-authored with Songying Fang), revised and resubmitted at Armed Forces & Society
"Beyond Dues: The Role of U.S. Military Aid in UN Peacekeeping Operations," invited to revise and resubmit at International Peacekeeping
"The Effect of Biased Peacekeepers on Building Trust" (co-authored with Rick K. Wilson,), under review
"Reliable contributors? How Leader Changes Impacts Commitments to Peacekeeping" (co-authored with Tim Passmore)
"Burden Sharing in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Who Deploys to the Frontlines?"